Richard Dawkins: The Untutored Philosopher

Dawkins the Epistemologist

Richard Dawkins is often heralded as a brilliant scientist. Unfortunately he often resorts to shoddy philosophy. Several examples of Dawkins’ philosophical ineptness have been pointed out over the years, one of the more prominent being that his self-described “central argument” in The God Delusion is not even logically valid.[1] In a more recent book, The Magic of Reality: How We Know What’s Really True, Dawkins again leaves the realm of science (perhaps unwittingly) and tries his hand at philosophy. But regrettably the results don’t fare any better.

The very title of Dawkins’ book should cause us pause: The Magic of Reality: How We Know What’s Really True. Notice the subtitle of this book is philosophical in nature, i.e., How We Know is an epistemological question, not scientific. Epistemology is a branch of philosophy (not science) which deals with how knowledge is defined, what we know, and how we know it. It is an area of study Dawkins simply isn’t qualified to address, and this becomes painfully obvious as one continues reading. In chapter one, Dawkins summarizes his view of knowledge which functions as the epistemological foundation for the rest of his book:

Apathy, Atheism, and the Absurdity of Life Without God

Here is a truth I wish everyone would take the time to earnestly and honestly contemplate:

If God does not exist and there is no life after death, then there is no ultimate meaning, value, or purpose in life.

The question of God’s existence is the most important question we can seek to answer. If God does not exist and we do not survive the death of our bodies, life is ultimately absurd. J.P. Moreland provides an illustration which helps bring this truth home:

Suppose I invited you over to my house to play a game of Monopoly. When you arrive I announce that the game is going to be a bit different. Before us is the Monopoly board, a set of jacks, a coin, the television remote, and a refrigerator in the corner of the room. I grant you the first turn, and puzzlingly, inform you that you may do anything you want: fill the board with hotels, throw the coin in the air, toss a few jacks, fix a sandwich, or turn on the television. You respond by putting hotels all over the board and smugly sit back as I take my turn. I respond by dumping the board upside down and tossing the coin in the air. Somewhat annoyed, you right the board and replenish it with hotels. I turn on the television and dump the board over again.

Now it wouldn’t take too many cycles of this nonsense to recognize that it didn’t really matter what you did with your turn, and here’s why. There is no goal, no purpose to the game we are playing. Our successive turns form a series of one meaningless event after another. Why? Because if the game as a whole has no purpose, the individual moves within the game are pointless. Conversely, only a game’s actual purpose according to its inventor can give the individual moves significance.[1]

As Moreland articulates, if the game of Monopoly as a whole has no purpose, the individual moves within the game have no meaning or value. The only way your moves within the game of Monopoly have significance is if you discover the purpose of the game and you align yourself with that purpose.

William Lane Craig vs. Richard Dawkins

Craig and Dawkins square off on stage later today! Yesterday I received this Facebook note from William Lane Craig. Since he sent this to all his "friends," I'm assuming it's public information. In case you're unaware, a debate between Dawkins and Craig would match up the world's most well known apologists for their respective worldviews: Dawkins for Atheism and Craig for Christianity. It's also worth noting that Dawkins has colorfully dismissed any future debate potential with WLC, which makes this so surprising.

Dr. Craig describes their first meeting...

I am currently in Mexico to participate in a conference called Ciudad de
las Ideas, which is a conference modeled on the TED conference in the US.
It features lots of high tech people, sociologists, psychologists, economists,
scientists, etc.

As part of the conference they´re having a panel of six of us debate on the
question ¨Does the Universe Have a Purpose?¨ Well. to my surprise, I just
found out that one of the three persons on the other side is Richard Dawkins!
It´s true! I met him the other night. When he came my way, I stuck out my
hand and introduced myself and said, Ï´m surspised to see that you´re on the
panel.

He replied, "And why not?"

I said, ¨Well, you´ve always refused to debate me."

His tone suddenly became icy cold. "I don´t consider this to be a debate with
you. The Mexicans invited me to participate, and I accepted.¨ At that, he
turned away.

¨Well, I hope we have a good discussion,¨ I said.

"I very much doubt it,¨ he said and walked off.

So it was a pretty chilly reception! The debate is Saturday morning,
should you think of us. I´ll give an update after I get
back.

The six-man debate panel is set to discuss the question, "Does the Universe have a Purpose?"



Affirmative Position: Rabbi David Wolpe, William Lane Craig, Douglas Geivett
Negative Position: Matt Ridley, Michael Shermer, Richard Dawkins



The organization's website has lots of videos posted so I'm hoping they will have this one up soon. I'll post it as soon as it becomes available.

UPDATE 11/14/2010: The video has been uploaded here on YouTube.

7 Factors for Testing a Historical Hypothesis

(Apologetics 315) by Brian Auten

The following is an excerpt from William Lane Craig's Reasonable Faith, 3rd Edition, p. 233:

"The process of determining which historical reconstruction is the best explanation will involve the historian's craft, as various factors will have to be weighed. In his book Justifying Historical Descriptions, C. Behan McCullagh lists the factors which historians typically weigh in testing a historical hypothesis:

1. The hypothesis, together with other true statements, must imply further statements describing present observable data.
2. The hypothesis must have greater explanatory scope (that is, imply a greater variety of observable data) than rival hypotheses.
3. The hypothesis must have greater explanatory power (that is, make the observable data more probable) than rival hypotheses.
4. The hypothesis must be more plausible (that is, be implied by a greater variety of accepted truths, and its negation implied by fewer accepted truths) than rival hypotheses.
5. The hypothesis must be less ad hoc (that is, include fewer new suppositions about the past not already implied by existing knowledge) than rival hypotheses.
6. The hypothesis must be disconfirmed by fewer accepted beleifs (that is, when conjoined with accepted truths, imply fewer false statements) than rival hypotheses.
7. The hypothesis must so exceed its rivals in fulfilling conditions (2)-(6) that there is little chance of a rival hypothesis, after further investigation, exceeding it in meeting these conditions."

For writings from William Lane Craig on the Historical Jesus, see here. Wikipedia on the historical method. Philosophical papers by C. Behan McCullagh here.

William Lane Craig on The Flying Spaghetti Monster

The Arrogance and Cowardice of Dickie Dawkins

James White of Alpha and Omega Ministries had this to say regarding Richard Dawkins:

...it is fascinating to observe the level of hubris, simple personal self-deception and arrogance, that defines Richard Dawkins as a human being who has dedicated his every moment of existence to his leadership of, and membership in, τῶν τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἐν ἀδικίᾳ κατεχόντων, those who suppress the truth in unrighteousness (Romans 1:18). Dawkins' published works have been juvenile in their philosophical, historical, and biblical errors, yet, being a "scientist" overshadows all of that, of course. Hence, he will not debate the very people who would be able to expose his numerous errors. Behold the creature in denial of his Creator:

In Intellectual Neutral

(Reasonablefaith.org) by William Lane Craig

A number of years ago, two books appeared that sent shock waves through the American educational community. The first of these, Cultural Literacy: What Every American Needs to Know, by E.D. Hirsch, documented the fact that large numbers of American college students do not have the basic background knowledge to understand the front page of a newspaper or to act responsibly as a citizen. For example, a quarter of the students in a recent survey thought Franklin D. Roosevelt was president during the Vietnam War. Two-thirds did not know when the Civil War occurred. One-third thought Columbus discovered the New World sometime after 1750. In a recent survey at California State University at Fullerton, over half the students could not identify Chaucer or Dante. Ninety percent did not know who Alexander Hamilton was, despite the fact that his picture is on every ten dollar bill.

These statistics would be funny if they weren't so alarming. What has happened to our schools that they should be producing such dreadfully ignorant people? Alan Bloom, who was an eminent educator at the University of Chicago and the author of the second book I referred to above, argued in his The Closing of the American Mind. that behind the current educational malaise lies the universal conviction of students that all truth is relative and, therefore, that truth is not worth pursuing. Bloom writes,

There is one thing a professor can be absolutely certain of: almost every student entering the university believes, or says he believes, that truth is relative. If this belief is put to the test, one can count on the students' reaction: they will be uncomprehending. That anyone should regard the proposition as not self-evident astonishes them, as though he were calling into question 2 + 2 = 4. These are things you don't think about. . . . That it is a moral issue for students is revealed by the character of their response when challenged—a combination of disbelief and indignation: "Are you an absolutist?," the only alternative they know, uttered in the same tone as . . . "Do you really believe in witches?" This latter leads into the indignation, for someone who believes in witches might well be a witch-hunter or a Salem judge. The danger they have been taught to fear from absolutism is not error but intolerance. Relativism is necessary to openness; and this is the virtue, the only virtue, which all primary education for more than fifty years has dedicated itself to inculcating. Openness—and the relativism that makes it the only plausible stance in the face of various claims to truth and various ways of life and kinds of human beings—is the great insight of our times. . . . The study of history and of culture teaches that all the world was mad in the past; men always thought they were right, and that led to wars, persecutions, slavery, xenophobia, racism, and chauvinism. The point is not to correct the mistakes and really be right; rather it is not to think you are right at all.1

Since there is no absolute truth, since everything is relative, the purpose of an education is not to learn truth or master facts—rather it is merely to acquire a skill so that one can go out and obtain wealth, power, and fame. Truth has become irrelevant.

Now, of course, this sort of relativistic attitude toward truth is antithetical to the Christian worldview. For as Christians we believe that all truth is God's truth, that God has revealed to us the truth, both in His Word and in Him who said, "I am the Truth." The Christian, therefore, can never look on the truth with apathy or disdain. Rather, he cherishes and treasures the truth as a reflection of God Himself. Nor does his commitment to truth make the Christian intolerant, as Bloom's students erroneously inferred; on the contrary, the very concept of tolerance entails that one does not agree with that which one tolerates. The Christian is committed to both truth and tolerance, for he believes in Him who said not only, "I am the Truth," but also, "Love your enemies."

Now at the time that these books were released, I was teaching in the Religious Studies department at a Christian liberal arts college. So I began to wonder: how much have Christian students been infected with the attitude that Bloom describes? How would my own students fare on one of E.D. Hirsch's tests? Well, how would they? I thought. Why not give them such a quiz?

So I did.

...click here to finish reading article...

The Thought Police: The Conceptual Problem with Hate Crime Legislation

(Biola.edu/news) by Kevin Lewis Nobody in their right mind wants to be identified with hate. And those who promote “Hate Crime” legislation, such as the current president and congress, know it. For this reason one of the worst kinds of criminal legislation has found a home in the American legal system. And this legislation is both dangerous and ineffective.

The basic problem with the concept of hate crimes is that hate crimes criminalize thought, rather than behavior. Historically, criminal law exists to punish proscribed behavior. Criminal law was never intended—and should not be enacted—to punish thought.

For the record, the essential elements of a crime include (1) a proscribed voluntary act committed with (2) the requisite intent for that particular crime. That’s it. For example, for one to be convicted of battery, a person would need to willfully and unlawfully use force or violence upon another person. Motive has nothing to do with substantive criminal law. A bad motive does not make an act a crime any more than a good motive will prevent an act from being a crime. As such, the motive of “hate” for a particular race, gender, or sexual behavior group, like homosexuals, is irrelevant to substantive criminal law.

Here is how a “hate crime” works. If one commits a “regular” battery, a specific punishment is given, but if the battery was motivated by “hate” for the person in the protected class, a sentence enhancement is added to the punishment for “regular” battery. Now if the sentence enhancement for “hate” is 5 years, the person was sentenced to 5 years in jail for thinking the wrong way. This is simply unacceptable for a number of reasons.

First, it criminalizes thought. Enough said. Second, if the motive of “hate” can be added as an element of a crime, it is certainly possible for a legislative body to separate the “hate” element of the crime into a separate offense, which would simply criminalize the motive itself. Third, it could have the effect of establishing a constitutionally suspect “status” crime, which would simply punish a person of a particular character, such as, being a “mean” or “hateful” person. Fourth, hate crime statutes are virtually useless and merely symbolic. They do not prevent crime. Thugs who commit hateful, racially motivated murders will not be dissuaded from doing so in the future because it will now be considered a “hate” crime with a sentence enhancement. Fifth, this is a law enforcement issue, not a legislative issue. If a particular group of people are being targeted as victims, law enforcement agencies are able to direct resources and create task forces to focus on these problems.

Finally, one of the worst aspects of hate crime legislation is that it arguably creates an unequal status under law for some classes of people. How so, you ask? If a criminal receives a greater penalty for victimizing one type of human being over another, the greater penalty indicates a greater harm was committed against that victim. But this is not so. All humans are made in the image of God and are innately equal in value. Hate crime legislation, however, rejects this self evident truth that all men are created equal and endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights. The punishment for crimes should be the same for all human beings. All are equally precious.

Violent crime is always wrong against any person and should be vigorously prosecuted and punished. But this latest federal enactment of a hate crime statute is simply another step toward tyranny and it, along with all hate crime legislation, should be repealed.
Written by Kevin Lewis, Professor of Theology and Law, Biola University. Kevin Lewis, J.D., is also the founder and director of the Evangelical Law Institute (http://www.lawandjustice.org/), and he regularly teaches church-state classes, systematic theology, and Christian apologetics at Biola University.

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Click here to listen to a 16-minute talk on this issue by William Lane Craig

The Failure of Scientism

Science is good, but science isn't everything. Taken to an abnormal and irrational extreme it may be properly labeled "scientism." This is the view that "science is the only paradigm of truth and rationality...Everything outside of science is a matter of mere belief and subjective opinion, of which rational assessment is impossible."(1) In other words, you can't know something unless you can prove it scientifically.

In a 1998 debate, William Lane Craig faced off against Peter Atkins on the question "What is the Evidence For/Against the Existence of God?" During the debate, Peter Atkins made the claim that science can account for everything and is "omnipotent." When questioned by Atkins regarding what science can't account for, Craig lists the following five examples of things that cannot be scientifically proven but that we are all rational to accept:

1. Logical and mathematical truths
2. Metaphysical truths
3. Ethical beliefs about statements of value
4. Aesthetic judgments
5. Science itself

Watch the clip here:



If you enjoyed this short clip, download the entire debate:

Full MP3 audio here.

Enjoy!
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1. See Love Your God With All Your Mind, J.P. Moreland, pg. 144.

Dawkins' Delusion

(Reasonablefaith.org) William Lane Craig

Richard Dawkins has emerged as the enfant terrible of the movement known as the New Atheism. His best-selling book The God Delusion has become the literary centerpiece of that movement. In it Dawkins aims to show that belief in God is a delusion, that is to say, "a false belief or impression," or worse, "a persistent false belief held in the face of strong contradictory evidence."1 On pages 157-8 of his book, Dawkins summarizes what he calls "the central argument of my book." Note it well. If this argument fails, then Dawkins' book is hollow at its core. And, in fact, the argument is embarrassingly weak.

It goes as follows:

1. One of the greatest challenges to the human intellect has been to explain how the complex, improbable appearance of design in the universe arises.

2. The natural temptation is to attribute the appearance of design to actual design itself.

3. The temptation is a false one because the designer hypothesis immediately raises the larger problem of who designed the designer.

4. The most ingenious and powerful explanation is Darwinian evolution by natural selection.

5. We don't have an equivalent explanation for physics.

6. We should not give up the hope of a better explanation arising in physics, something as powerful as Darwinism is for biology.

Therefore, God almost certainly does not exist.

This argument is jarring because the atheistic conclusion that "Therefore, God almost certainly does not exist" seems to come suddenly out of left field. You don't need to be a philosopher to realize that that conclusion doesn't follow from the six previous statements.

Indeed, if we take these six statements as premises of an argument intended to logically imply the conclusion "Therefore, God almost certainly does not exist," then the argument is patently invalid. No logical rules of inference would permit you to draw this conclusion from the six premises.

A more charitable interpretation would be to take these six statements, not as premises, but as summary statements of six steps in Dawkins' cumulative argument for his conclusion that God does not exist. But even on this charitable construal, the conclusion "Therefore, God almost certainly does not exist" simply doesn't follow from these six steps, even if we concede that each of them is true and justified. The only delusion demonstrated here is Dawkins' conviction that this is "a very serious argument against God's existence."2

So what does follow from the six steps of Dawkins' argument? At most, all that follows is that we should not infer God's existence on the basis of the appearance of design in the universe. But that conclusion is quite compatible with God's existence and even with our justifiably believing in God's existence. Maybe we should believe in God on the basis of the cosmological argument or the ontological argument or the moral argument. Maybe our belief in God isn't based on arguments at all but is grounded in religious experience or in divine revelation. Maybe God wants us to believe in him simply by faith. The point is that rejecting design arguments for God's existence does nothing to prove that God does not exist or even that belief in God is unjustified. Indeed, many Christian theologians have rejected arguments for the existence of God without thereby committing themselves to atheism.

So Dawkins' argument for atheism is a failure even if we concede, for the sake of argument, all its steps. But, in fact, several of these steps are plausibly false in any case. Take just step (3), for example. Dawkins' claim here is that one is not justified in inferring design as the best explanation of the complex order of the universe because then a new problem arises: Who designed the designer?

This objection is flawed on at least two counts.

First, in order to recognize an explanation as the best, one needn't have an explanation of the explanation. This is an elementary point concerning inference to the best explanation as practiced in the philosophy of science. If archaeologists digging in the earth were to discover things looking like arrowheads and hatchet heads and pottery shards, they would be justified in inferring that these artifacts are not the chance result of sedimentation and metamorphosis, but products of some unknown group of people, even though they had no explanation of who these people were or where they came from. Similarly, if astronauts were to come upon a pile of machinery on the back side of the moon, they would be justified in inferring that it was the product of intelligent, extra-terrestrial agents, even if they had no idea whatsoever who these extra-terrestrial agents were or how they got there.

In order to recognize an explanation as the best, one needn't be able to explain the explanation. In fact, so requiring would lead to an infinite regress of explanations, so that nothing could ever be explained and science would be destroyed. So in the case at hand, in order to recognize that intelligent design is the best explanation of the appearance of design in the universe, one needn't be able to explain the designer.

Second, Dawkins thinks that in the case of a divine designer of the universe, the designer is just as complex as the thing to be explained, so that no explanatory advance is made. This objection raises all sorts of questions about the role played by simplicity in assessing competing explanations—for example, how simplicity is to be weighted in comparison with other criteria like explanatory power, explanatory scope, plausibility, and so forth. If a less simple hypothesis exceeds its rivals in explanatory scope and power, for example, then it may well be the preferred explanation, despite the sacrifice in simplicity.

But leave those questions aside. Dawkins' fundamental mistake lies in his assumption that a divine designer is an entity comparable in complexity to the universe. As an unembodied mind, God is a remarkably simple entity. As a non-physical entity, a mind is not composed of parts, and its salient properties, like self-consciousness, rationality, and volition, are essential to it. In contrast to the contingent and variegated universe with all its inexplicable physical quantities and constants (mentioned in the fifth step of Dawkins' argument),3 a divine mind is startlingly simple. Certainly such a mind may have complex ideas (it may be thinking, for example, of the infinitesimal calculus), but the mind itself is a remarkably simple entity. Dawkins has evidently confused a mind's ideas, which may, indeed, be complex, with a mind itself, which is an incredibly simple entity.4 Therefore, postulating a divine mind behind the universe most definitely does represent an advance in simplicity, for whatever that's worth.

Other steps in Dawkins' argument are also problematic; but I think enough has been said to show that his argument does nothing to undermine a design inference based on the universe's complexity, not to speak of its serving as a justification of atheism.

Several years ago my atheist colleague Quentin Smith unceremoniously crowned Stephen Hawking's argument against God in A Brief History of Time as "the worst atheistic argument in the history of Western thought."5 With the advent of The God Delusion the time has come, I think, to relieve Hawking of this weighty crown and to recognize Richard Dawkins' accession to the throne.
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Endnotes

1 Richard Dawkins, The God Delusion (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2006), 5.

2 Ibid., 157. Indeed, he fancies himself to have offered a "devastating" and "unrebuttable refutation" of God's existence.

3 Otherwise known as the fine-tuning of the universe for life. The optimism expressed in step (6) of Dawkins' argument with respect to finding a physical explanation for the cosmic fine-tuning is really quite baseless and represents little more than the faith of a naturalist. For discussion of the design argument from the fine-tuning of nature's constants and quantities, see William Lane Craig, Reasonable Faith, 3rd ed. (Wheaton, IL: Crossway, 2008), 157-79.

4 His confusion is evident when he complains, "A God capable of continuously monitoring and controlling the individual status of every particle in the universe cannot be simple. . . . Worse (from the point of view of simplicity), other corners of God's giant consciousness are simultaneously preoccupied with the doings and emotions and prayers of every single human being—and whatever intelligent aliens there might be on other planets in this and 100 billion other galaxies" (God Delusion, 149). This conflates God with what God is thinking about. To say that God, as an immaterial entity, is extraordinarily simple is not to endorse Aquinas' doctrine that God is logically simple (rejected by Dawkins on 150). God may have diverse properties without having the sort of complexity Dawkins is talking about, namely "heterogeneity of parts" (ibid., 150).

5 Quentin Smith, "The Wave Function of a Godless Universe," in Theism, Atheism, and Big Bang Cosmology (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), 322.

Happy Resurrection Day!

HE IS RISEN! HE IS RISEN INDEED!

Looking for some resources on the life, death, and resurrection of Christ?
You might want to check out the following:

1. Gary Habermas' website, an excellent resource.

2. Articles by William Lane Craig, both scholarly and popular.

3. Great audio, including debates, as well as book reviews and essays at Apologetics315.

4. Risen Jesus, the apologetics ministry of Mike Licona.

Recommended books (just to name a few):
1. The Case for the Resurrection of Jesus, by Gary Habermas and Michael Licona (If you get one book on the resurrection I would make it this one)

2. The Son Rises, by William Lane Craig

3. The Resurrection of the Son of God, by N.T. Wright (A hefty book that can also double as a weapon)

4. The Historical Jesus, by Gary Habermas

5. Jesus and the Eyewitnesses, by Richard Bauckham

God Is Not Dead Yet

(Awakengeneration.com) Frank Turek

The following is from Christian Philosopher William Lane Craig’s recent article “God is not Dead Yet” in Christianity Today. I encourage you to read the entire article. I include this section on the moral argument because of our recent discussion here about how the existence of objective morality requires God– a claim that atheists have yet to refute.

The moral argument. A number of ethicists, such as Robert Adams, William Alston, Mark Linville, Paul Copan, John Hare, Stephen Evans, and others have defended “divine command” theories of ethics, which support various moral arguments for God’s existence.

One such argument:

1. If God does not exist, objective moral values and duties do not exist.
2. Objective moral values and duties do exist.
3. Therefore, God exists.

By objective values and duties, one means values and duties that are valid and binding independent of human opinion. A good many atheists and theists alike concur with premise (1). For given a naturalistic worldview, human beings are just animals, and activity that we count as murder, torture, and rape is natural and morally neutral in the animal kingdom. Moreover, if there is no one to command or prohibit certain actions, how can we have moral obligations or prohibitions?

Premise (2) might seem more disputable, but it will probably come as a surprise to most laypeople to learn that (2) is widely accepted among philosophers. For any argument against objective morals will tend to be based on premises that are less evident than the reality of moral values themselves, as apprehended in our moral experience. Most philosophers therefore do recognize objective moral distinctions.

Nontheists will typically counter the moral argument with a dilemma: Is something good because God wills it, or does God will something because it is good? The first alternative makes good and evil arbitrary, whereas the second makes the good independent of God. Fortunately, the dilemma is a false one. Theists have traditionally taken a third alternative: God wills something because he is good. That is to say, what Plato called “the Good” is the moral nature of God himself. God is by nature loving, kind, impartial, and so on. He is the paradigm of goodness. Therefore, the good is not independent of God.

Moreover, God’s commandments are a necessary expression of his nature. His commands to us are therefore not arbitrary but are necessary reflections of his character. This gives us an adequate foundation for the affirmation of objective moral values and duties.

crossexamined.org